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Mandatory minimum sentencing policies
and cocaine use in the U.S., 1985–2013
Lauryn Saxe Walker1* and Briana Mezuk2,3,4
Abstract
Background: As of May 2017, the United States federal government renewed its prioritization for the enforcement
of mandatory minimum sentences for illicit drug offenses. While the effect of such policies on racial disparities in
incarceration is well-documented, less is known about the extent to which these laws are associated with
decreased drug use. This study aims to identify changes in cocaine use associated with mandatory minimum
sentencing policies by examining differential sentences for powder and crack cocaine set by the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act (ADAA) (100:1) and the Fair Sentencing Act (FSA), which reduced the disparate sentencing to 18:1.
Methods: Using data from National Survey on Drug Use and Health, we examined past-year cocaine use before
and after implementation of the ADAA (1985–1990, N = 21,296) and FSA (2009–2013, N = 130,574). We used
weighted logistic regressions and Z-tests across models to identify differential change in use between crack and
powder cocaine. Prescription drug misuse, or use outside prescribed indication or dose, was modeled as a negative
control to identify underlying drug trends not related to sentencing policies.
Results: Despite harsher ADAA penalties for crack compared to powder cocaine, there was no decrease in crack
use following implementation of sentencing policies (odds ratio (OR): 0.72, p = 0.13), although both powder cocaine
use and misuse of prescription drugs (the negative control) decreased (OR: 0.59, p < 0.01; OR: 0.42, p < 0.01
respectively). Furthermore, there was no change in crack use following the FSA, but powder cocaine use decreased,
despite no changes to powder cocaine sentences (OR: 0.81, p = 0.02), suggesting that drug use is driven by factors
not associated with sentencing policy.
Conclusions: Despite harsher penalties for crack versus powder cocaine, crack use declined less than powder
cocaine and even less than drugs not included in sentencing policies. These findings suggest that mandatory
minimum sentencing may not be an effective method of deterring cocaine use.
Keywords: Substance abuse, Substance use disorder, Mandatory minimum sentencing, Cocaine use, Crack cocaine,
Anti-drug abuse act, Fair sentencing act, Freebase cocaine, Cocaine base
Background
In May 2017, US Attorney General Jeffrey Sessions sent
a memorandum directing federal prosecutors that they
“must disclose to the sentencing court all facts that im-
pact the sentencing guidelines or mandatory minimum
sentences [1].” With this direction, a renewed emphasis
was placed on mandatory sentences, reversing a 2013
policy that permitted prosecutors to withhold informa-
tion to avoid triggering mandatory sentencing guidelines
[1]. Mandatory minimum sentences have been used for
centuries to target crimes seen as especially serious or
disruptive [2]. However, the efficacy of these laws in re-
ducing targeted behaviors remains unclear [2–4]. The
handful of rigorous evaluations conducted to date have
focused on firearms, and have demonstrated little effect
of mandatory minimum sentences on gun crimes [3, 5].
Furthermore, research into the association between in-
carceration rates and reported drug use behavior sug-
gests that correlations are weak at best [6, 7]. Still,
sentencing laws continue to be used, and even broad-
ened as means to deter illicit drug use.
In the early 1980s, cocaine grew in popularity in the
US, with 1.6 million new users between 1982 and 1985,
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and a four-fold increase in cocaine-related emergency
department visits between 1985 and 1988 [8, 9]. Public
concern about cocaine and the emerging derivative crack
(or base) cocaine (a less costly form of the drug that is
smoked as opposed to inhaled) reached hysteria levels,
with more than 1000 stories reported in various national
newspapers and magazines in the months before the
1986 election [10]. Despite lack of scientific evidence,
crack cocaine, in particular, was seen as a highly addict-
ive drug that led to unpredictable, often violent behavior,
including increased gang-related violence in urban areas
[10–13]. In addition to media frenzy surrounding the
wave of violence and addiction seen as stemming from
the new form of cocaine, the widely-publicized death of
Len Bias, a Boston Celtics draft pick who died following
an overdose in his college dormitory solidified the public
outcry for action from public officials [14–16]. This
event, among others, ignited a political response to the
growing epidemic which culminated in the enactment of
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act (ADAA) of 1986, setting
mandatory minimum sentences for illicit drug offenses.
The ADAA covered most illicit drugs and set differing
minimum sentences based on type and quantity of these
substances. The structure of the law was based in deter-
rence theory, which argues that human behavior is
driven by cost-benefit ratios; therefore, increasing associ-
ated costs should deter a given behavior [17]. In the case
of ADAA, this theory would suggest that drug use can
be deterred to varying degrees based on the perceived
harshness of criminal penalties [17].
In the 1980s, it was widely believed that cocaine base
had more abuse potential and associated social harms
relative to powder cocaine [18]. Therefore, the ADAA
sentencing guidelines established harsher penalties for co-
caine base than powder cocaine. Specifically, the quantity
of substance that triggered the mandatory sentencing was
a 100:1 ratio of powder cocaine to cocaine base, meaning
that 500 g of powder cocaine would carry the equivalent
criminal sentence to 5 g of cocaine base [18]. While this
law was initially directed toward drug trafficking, it was
amended in 1988 to include possession offenses [19].
In the two decades since enactment, evidence mounted
that implementation of the ADAA led to significant racial
disparities in incarceration [20]. This disparity appeared to
be in part due to powder cocaine use being more preva-
lent among white males, while cocaine base use was more
prevalent among black males. Black males were also more
likely to be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law than
were white males [20, 21]. Although concern about the
harms of cocaine base remained, efforts to reduce these
racial disparities resulted in the Fair Sentencing Act of
2010 (FSA). This law decreased mandatory minimum sen-
tences associated with cocaine base while maintaining
existing sentences for powder cocaine. Specifically, the
FSA modified the powder cocaine to cocaine base ratio
from 100:1 to 18:1, so that 28 g of cocaine base held the
same sentence as 500 g of powder cocaine [22].
While many studies have focused on the social conse-
quences of mandatory minimum sentencing laws, sur-
prisingly few have directly measured their impact on
substance use in the general population [20, 21, 23–25].
In the little research that has been conducted, it was
found that one of the unintended consequences of the
ADAA was that the purity of cocaine increased by 57%,
likely as a response to quantity restrictions [26], and
thus it is possible that use of this drug also changed.
There are several historical examples of the impact of
mandatory minimum sentences on drug use in the United
States. In 1956, the Narcotic Control Act set such penal-
ties for narcotics, including heroin; however, over the next
decade, narcotic use accelerated and this legislation was
considered a failure [27, 28]. As a result, these mandatory
sentences were repealed in 1970 [27, 29]. However, some
believed at the time that other types of drugs, especially
cocaine, might have been more responsive to sentencing
measures [28].
When enacted, mandatory minimum sentences were tou-
ted as a way to “curb drug use.” [30] The goal of this study
is to assess the extent to which mandatory minimum sen-
tences achieved the intended effect of deterring substance
use behaviors by using the natural quasi-experiment of the
introduction of mandatory minimum sentences for cocaine
through the ADAA and their subsequent relaxation with
the FSA. If mandatory minimum sentencing policies de-
terred cocaine use in the general population, then the
ADAA should be associated with reduced use of both
forms of the drug, with greater pressure applied to cocaine
base. Second, if the sentence is the driving force behind co-
caine base use, relaxing pressure on cocaine base use
through the FSA should have resulted in increased use of
cocaine base with no change in powder cocaine use. Finally,
if any observed changes in drug use were indeed due to the
ADAA and FSA, these laws should have had no influence
on use of drugs not targeted by these policies (e.g., misuse
of prescription medications like tranquilizers and sedatives).
By including prescription drug misuse as a negative control,
we can differentiate between changes in use of drugs expli-
citly included in the policy and changes in underlying
trends independent of the sentencing guidelines, such as
those that may be related to market factors or period effects
(i.e., “Just Say No” campaign) [31].
Methods
Sample
Our sample is based on repeated cross-sectional data
from the 1985, 1988, and 1990 National Survey on Drug
Use and Health (NSDUH) for the ADAA cohort and the
2009, 2012, and 2013 surveys for the FSA cohort [32].
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NSDUH, previously known as the National Household
Survey on Drug Abuse, is a nationally-representative
cross-sectional household survey sponsored by the Sub-
stance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration
(SAMHSA) [33]. Using a multi-stage area probability de-
sign, the survey gathers detailed information on tobacco,
alcohol, and illicit drug use from households and individ-
uals. The NSDUH pioneered several methodological inno-
vations to enhance validity of the data, and reliability
studies have shown consistent responses for lifetime and
past year drug use [34]. In addition to NSDUH-specific
validity reports, self-reported illicit drug use, in general, is
considered a valid and reliable means of measurement
[35, 36]. Response rates for these five years ranged from
77% in 1988 to 88% in 2009. The NSDUH is publicly
available from SAMHSA and all participants provided in-
formed consent.
We exclude children under the age of 15, since they
received only a partial survey, as well as observations
with missing information on cocaine base or powder co-
caine use or a key covariate. We further exclude respon-
dents who report having misused a prescription opioid
(defined as having used an opiate for non-medical pur-
poses, i.e. “to get high”) or used heroin in any form in
the past year from both ADAA and FSA analyses in
order to avoid potential confounding factors associated
with the rising opioid epidemic. The final analytic sam-
ple size is 21,296 for the ADAA cohort and 130,574 for
the FSA cohort reflecting the increase in the overall
NSDUH sample between these time periods.
Outcome measures
We define cocaine base as any freebase or crack cocaine
use within the previous 12months. The 1985 NSDUH
survey was the first year that cocaine base was included
in the questionnaire. In this survey, respondents were
asked about any type of cocaine use in the past 12
months, and lifetime use of freebase cocaine. If the re-
spondent reported having used any type of cocaine
within the last year and freebase at any point, we catego-
rized them as having used cocaine base within the last
year. Although this may lead to overestimation of 1985
cocaine base use, this overestimation is likely minimal
since this form of the drug did not emerge outside of se-
lect regions until roughly 1984 and is considered to have
been widespread only beginning in 1985 [14, 37]. How-
ever, if there were an overestimation of cocaine base use
in 1985, this would exaggerate our estimates in change
of use of cocaine base following the ADAA, but should
not affect the estimates for powder cocaine. For later
surveys, respondents were directly asked about crack or
freebase cocaine use within the last 12 months.
While crack and freebase cocaine are not identical forms
of cocaine, both are considered cocaine base under the
ADAA and FSA laws. For our ADAA models we use free-
base use as our cocaine base indicator, since this terminology
was most consistently understood during this period. While
not all freebase users during this period reported crack use,
all crack users reported freebase use. Over the FSA period,
freebase use was no longer included in the survey since
terminology had changed so that “crack” was the more
recognizable term. Since definitions are consistent within
time periods and, therefore, across grouped models, no
biases should be introduced by the change in terminology.
Powder cocaine includes only those who have used
powder cocaine within the past 12 months, but have not
used cocaine base. If a person uses both forms of co-
caine, they are categorized as cocaine base users; we
conducted sensitivity analyses to assess the impact of
this classification strategy (described in Sensitivity Ana-
lyses section).
Prescription drug misuse in the past 12 months is de-
fined as use of prescription sedatives and/or tranquil-
izers (e.g., Quaalude, Xanax, or Valium) either without a
prescription, in greater amounts than prescribed, more
often than prescribed, or for any non-medical reason
(i.e., to get high). Sedative and tranquilizer use was com-
mon in the 1960s and 1970s, and these medications
were among the most commonly-prescribed psycho-
active drugs in the US; both are associated with physio-
logic dependence and are considered potential drugs of
abuse [38]. These drugs were selected because although
the ADAA focused on cocaine base, it covered all
commonly-used illicit drugs at the time, including
marijuana, and no other campaigns contemporaneously
targeted misuse of these substances. Narcotics or opiates
are not included in our categorization of prescription
medications of abuse due to their cyclic popularity and
the potential confounding effects of the recent opioid
epidemic. In fact, we exclude respondents who report
past-year opioid use to ensure that confounders are not
introduced. Opiates are further addressed through add-
itional models described in the Sensitivity Analyses sec-
tion below. The medications included in the prescription
medication negative control were consistently assessed
in all six survey years. By using prescription drugs as a
negative control, we are able to isolate changes in co-
caine use due to sentencing policies from temporal
trends in drug use more generally.
Study design
We model the ADAA and FSA separately, first to ad-
dress differential implementation of mandatory mini-
mum sentences by cocaine type in the ADAA, and then
extend this analysis using the FSA to assess changes in
drug use following relaxation of this sentence discrep-
ancy. Three models per law are analyzed. The first
model estimates the change in cocaine base use after law
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implementation. The second model estimates the change
in powder cocaine use. If mandatory minimums drive
the change in drug use, we would expect that use would
decrease for both forms of cocaine, but that this de-
crease should be greater for cocaine base due to harsher
penalties. Finally, to ensure that any change in drug use
is in fact a result of sentencing guidelines, we fit a third
model as a negative control: prescription drug misuse,
indexed as misuse of tranquilizers and/or sedatives in
the past year. Misuse of prescription medications was
not targeted in either the ADAA or FSA laws, and thus
should not have been affected by changes to sentencing
guidelines for other drugs [36].
We use three years of survey data for both the ADAA
and FSA models. As the ADAA was enacted in 1986, 1985
is considered the baseline year. Since drug use is defined as
past year use, 1988 is used as the post-implementation year
to allow for a full year of drug use after ADAA enactment.
However, due to an amendment to the ADAA pertaining
to possession sentencing in 1988, 1990 is also included to
account for full implementation of the law (further de-
scribed in the Sensitivity Analyses section). Similarly, the
Fair Sentencing Act was enacted in August of 2010. There-
fore, in order to obtain full-year drug use estimates after
implementation, we use the 2012 NSDUH survey response.
We further add 2013 responses to ensure robust estimation
of post-FSA changes in drug use. As both the ADAA and
the FSA were popular, bipartisan bills passed in election
years, both laws were widely publicized as part of congres-
sional campaigns and enacted immediately; therefore, two
post-implementation years apiece should be sufficient to es-
timate changes in behavior related to sentencing reforms.
We do conduct a sensitivity analysis around this time frame
(as described in the Sensitivity Analyses section) and results
are robust to additional years.
Statistical analysis
We estimate the change in drug use using three identical
multivariable logistic models per law, one for each drug.
Drug use is defined as a binary indicator of having used
within the past 12 months or not. All regressions are
weighted to account for complex survey design in the
standard errors. Using the principles described by Pater-
noster et al., a Z-test is used to compare coefficients
across the models to determine if there is a differential
impact of the law on cocaine base versus powder co-
caine versus prescription drug misuse [39]. We use
dummy variables for years to identify the likelihood of
reporting drug use in the post-implementation period
compared to the pre-implementation period. All models
are adjusted for age (categorized as older or younger
than 25 years to accommodate the oversampling of
younger age groups), race (categorized as non-Hispanic
white, non-Hispanic black, Hispanic, or other), gender,
marital status (categorized as married, never married,
and separated/widowed/divorced), education level (cate-
gorized as under 18, less than high school, high school
graduate, some college, and college graduate), and in-
come level (categorized by modified income quartiles).
Models are also adjusted for past year use of licit (alco-
hol and tobacco) and other illicit (marijuana) drugs.
We use the Akaike information criterion for model se-
lection and verified goodness of fit with a survey weight-
adjusted Hosmer-Lemeshow test and Pregibon linktest.
Since all three models had to be identical to allow for
comparison, the three models had varying levels of fit.
However, unadjusted simple logistic regressions of out-
comes all indicated adequate specification. These estimates
were nearly identical to adjusted regression estimates (avail-
able upon request).
Analyses were conducted with StataSE 14 statistical soft-
ware using survey procedures to account for the study de-
sign. All reported p-values refer to two-tailed tests.
Sensitivity analyses
Categorization of cocaine use: We re-categorized re-
spondents who used both cocaine base and powder co-
caine as powder cocaine users (N = 1489 in the ADAA
cohort and N = 2847 in the FSA cohort), and find our re-
sults to be consistent regardless of categorization.
Modification of the ADAA: In 1988, the U.S. Congress
modified the ADAA to include drug possession in sen-
tencing guidelines in addition to drug trafficking. In our
main analysis, we use 1990 as the post-implementation
year to ensure we are capturing full implementation.
However, we estimate the change in drug use in 1988 as
well to monitor any variation in use that might be
present as the law is expanded and revised. We also con-
duct an analysis including 1991 in the post-implementation
period, which again provides similar estimates to the main
analysis.
Opiate users: To account for possible substitution ef-
fects of users switching from one drug, whether cocaine
or other prescription medications, to opioids, we exclude
respondents with non-medical use of prescription opi-
oids or who used heroin in any form in the past year
from both ADAA and FSA analyses. However, to ensure
that these respondents are not fundamentally different,
due to potential differences in level of addiction or de-
pendence or risk seeking behavior, we perform a sensitiv-
ity analysis including these respondents. While individual
model estimates varied somewhat from primary model es-
timates, overall conclusions remained consistent.
Results
Table 1 shows the distribution of sample characteristics by
survey year. Educational attainment is higher in the more
recent cohort, with nearly a quarter of respondents
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reporting less than a high school education during the
ADAA cohort as compared to approximately 14% of the
FSA cohort. In general, past-year use of cocaine base was
rare in the study sample, with just 1% reporting use in the
ADAA cohort and even fewer, less than 0.05%, in the FSA
cohort. Powder cocaine and prescription drug misuse were
somewhat more common with 2 to 4% of sample respon-
dents reporting use among the ADAA cohort and about 1%
in the FSA cohort. Use of all three drugs of interest declined
over the ADAA period, but reported use was higher in the
ADAA period than in the FSA period. Overall drug use
trends over the ADAA and FSA periods are shown in Fig. 1.
As expected, alcohol, cigarette and marijuana use were
highly predictive of both powder and base cocaine use
as well as prescription drug abuse. Race was also highly
predictive of the type of drug used, as noted in prior lit-
erature on racial disparities in drug-offense related incar-
ceration [23]. In both the ADAA and FSA models,
non-Hispanic blacks have a lower probability of report-
ing powder cocaine use or prescription drug misuse than
non-Hispanic whites, but are significantly more likely to
report cocaine base use (odds ratio (ORADAA): 2.59,
standard error (SE): 0.54; ORFSA: 2.58, SE: 68).
As shown in Table 2, use of powder cocaine decreased
after implementation of the ADAA while cocaine base use
remained largely unchanged (ORpowder: 0.59, SE: 0.08).
While this may appear to suggest that the ADAA was ef-
fective in deterring some form of cocaine use, when we
look at the change in prescription drug misuse, we again
find a significant decline (ORrx: 0.42, SE: 0.08). When we
Table 1 Sociodemographic characteristics of survey participants during ADAA and FSA periods
ADAA FSA
1985 1988 1990 2009 2012 2013
n = 6456
[N = 171,780,375]
n = 6948
[N = 181,588,628]
n = 7892
[N = 186,296,389]
n = 43,227
[N = 228,441,140]
n = 43,684
[N = 236,094,646]
n = 43,663
[N = 239,616,555]
% (SE) % (SE) % (SE) % (SE) % (SE) % (SE)
Younger than 25 years old 22.47% (0.007) 20.72% (0.007) 20.02% (0.006) 18.19% (0.002) 18.22% (0.002) 18.20% (0.002)
Female 53.53% (0.010) 52.32% (0.008) 52.49% (0.009) 51.94% (0.004) 52.08% (0.004) 51.96% (0.005)
Race
Non-Hispanic White 80.47% (0.011) 79.53% (0.014) 78.84% (0.016) 67.46% (0.004) 65.64% (0.004) 65.22% (0.004)
Non-Hispanic Black 10.85% (0.007) 10.99% (0.011) 10.98% (0.013) 11.99% (0.003) 11.70% (0.003) 11.92% (0.003)
Hispanic 6.79% (0.007) 7.27% (0.008) 7.54% (0.009) 14.15% (0.003) 15.12% (0.003) 15.31% (0.003)
Other 1.90% (0.003) 2.20% (0.003) 2.65% (0.004) 6.40% (0.002) 7.54% (0.003) 7.55% (0.003)
Marital status
Married 60.38% (0.009) 60.37% (0.010) 61.15% (0.011) 52.83% (0.004) 50.89% (0.004) 50.36% (0.004)
Separated/divorced/widowed 16.19% (0.007) 16.83% (0.006) 16.74% (0.008) 18.06% (0.004) 19.55% (0.004) 19.47% (0.004)
Never married 23.44% (0.007) 22.81% (0.008) 22.11% (0.008) 29.10% (0.003) 29.57% (0.003) 30.16% (0.003)
Education
15–18 year olds 5.76% (0.003) 5.53% (0.002) 5.31% (0.002) 5.19% (0.001) 5.01% (0.001) 4.93% (0.001)
Less than high school 23.61% (0.010) 24.30% (0.011) 22.74% (0.010) 14.29% (0.003) 13.68% (0.003) 12.64% (0.003)
High school graduate 35.18% (0.010) 34.34% (0.010) 34.22% (0.010) 29.10% (0.004) 28.11% (0.004) 28.09% (0.004)
Some college 18.29% (0.008) 18.87% (0.009) 18.67% (0.008) 23.68% (0.004) 24.90% (0.004) 25.59% (0.004)
College graduate 17.15% (0.011) 16.96% (0.009) 19.06% (0.011) 27.74% (0.004) 28.30% (0.004) 28.75% (0.004)
Annual Income (quartiles)
0–25% 17.17% (0.009) 17.73% (0.009) 22.04% (0.010) 17.15% (0.003) 18.62% (0.003) 18.00% (0.003)
25–50% 21.58% (0.007) 17.88% (0.008) 16.64% (0.006) 21.64% (0.004) 22.10% (0.004) 20.49% (0.003)
50–75% 29.72% (0.009) 28.76% (0.010) 23.60% (0.008) 28.37% (0.004) 27.24% (0.004) 28.04% (0.004)
75–100% 26.69% (0.011) 30.61% (0.012) 31.04% (0.011) 32.83% (0.004) 32.04% (0.004) 33.47% (0.004)
Unknown 4.84% (0.004) 5.01% (0.006) 6.68% (0.007)
Alcohol Use in Past Year 74.29% (0.013) 69.72% (0.012) 67.49% (0.015) 68.69% (0.004) 68.36% (0.004) 68.26% (0.004)
Cigarette Use in Past Year 35.88% (0.009) 34.38% (0.009) 32.32% (0.009) 27.04% (0.004) 25.61% (0.004) 24.84% (0.004)
Marijuana Use in Past Year 12.94% (0.005) 9.50% (0.005) 9.34% (0.005) 9.64% (0.002) 10.69% (0.002) 11.23% (0.002)
Notes: SE standard error
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compare the magnitude of decline in use across all three
drugs using Z-tests, we find that all drugs declined to
similar degrees, showing no differential decline by drug or
form of cocaine (Z-scorebase vs powder: 0.80, P = 0.42;
Z-scorebase vs rx: 1.94, P = 0.05; Z-scorepowder vs rx: 1.50,
P = 0.13). If any indication of differential change in use
is suggested in these models, it is that prescription drug
use declined to a greater extent than cocaine base, dir-
ectly contradicting the hypothesis of deterrence.
In the FSA models, we expected to see no change in
use of powder cocaine and misuse of prescription drugs
since neither were affected by the law. However, while
we found no change in prescription drug misuse, we
again found a decrease in powder cocaine use after FSA
implementation (ORpowder: 0.81, SE: 0.07. While we ex-
pected to find an increase in cocaine base use due to re-
laxation of sentencing, instead we found no change in
cocaine base use (ORbase: 0.75, SE: 0.17). In comparing
the magnitude of the change across the three types of
drugs, we again find no statistically different changes be-
tween drug forms. This is contrary to expected findings
if sentencing guidelines are driving change in substance
use. Differential changes in drug use for the ADAA and
FSA are represented in Fig. 2.
Discussion
The ADAA set different mandatory minimum senten-
cing guidelines to deter the use of cocaine base more
than powder cocaine. Based on our results, it can be
concluded that these differential sentences are not asso-
ciated with differing drug use behavior. Our study does
not propose to identify other explanations for changes in
drug use patterns, such as substitution, availability,
purity or cost, and therefore, we cannot rule out that
these occurred. Instead, this study narrowly focuses on
mandatory sentencing laws to determine whether or not
drug use patterns are consistent with those expected to
occur if harsher sentences deterred use. Here, we find
no evidence that sentencing policies deterred cocaine
base use. These findings are consistent with prior re-
search that has found that incarceration rates are unre-
lated to drug use behavior and that effectiveness of a
Fig. 1 Drug use trends during the ADAA and FSA periods
Table 2 Change in drug use post-ADAA and post-FSA by form and type of drug
Cocaine base Powder cocaine Prescription drugs
Odds ratio (SE) Odds ratio (SE) Odds ratio (SE)
ADAA (N = 21,296)
Expansion of ADAA (1988) 0.85 (0.174) 0.83 (0.112) 0.84 (0.132)
Fill ADAA Implementation (1990) 0.72 (0.153) 0.59 (0.080)*** 0.42 (0.078)***
FSA (N = 130,574)
FSA Implementation (2012, 2013) 0.75 (0.167) 0.81 (0.074)** 1.00 (0.091)
Notes: SE standard error, *** P < 0.01, ** P < 0.05, * P < 0.1; all analyses excludes person who used opiates in the past year, adjusted for age, sex, race/ethnicity,
marital status, education, income, alcohol use, tobacco use, and marijuana use; all models are weighted to account for complex survey design
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deterrence tends to hinge on certainty and immediacy of
punishment rather than severity [6, 40].
Mandatory minimum sentencing laws for trafficking and
possession were not associated with differential changes in
drug use for crack as compared to powder cocaine use, as
would have been expected if sentencing guidelines drove
change in drug use. While there was a statistically signifi-
cant decline in powder cocaine after the ADAA was fully
enforced, this decline did not differ from the decline in pre-
scription drug misuse which was unrelated to mandatory
sentencing implementation, and no decline was seen in co-
caine base, the primary drug of focus. Our findings suggest
that drug use trends shifted alongside, rather than in direct
response to, implementation of the ADAA and FSA. In
short, the decline in cocaine base and powder cocaine use
that occurred in the US during the 1980s cannot be attrib-
uted to the ADAA. Similarly, the FSA is not associated with
changes in cocaine base use despite relaxing sentencing
requirements for cocaine base. These findings do not sup-
port the hypothesis that the ADAA had a substantive in-
fluence on use of cocaine base and powder cocaine in the
community-dwelling population. In total, we find no evi-
dence to support mandatory minimum sentences as a
causal explanation for changes in drug use behavior, and
in fact, data is inconsistent with this hypothesis.
It may be argued that no differential effect in drug use is
seen because while cocaine base users experienced harsher
penalties, other drug users may have been more readily able
to decrease use because they were less addicted. Despite
harsh penalties, cocaine base users simply had a more in-
elastic demand for their drug of choice compared to other
drug users, so even less severe consequences resulted in lar-
ger changes in behavior among powder cocaine and those
who misuse prescription drug. While this scenario could re-
sult in all three categories of drug users decreasing use at
similar rates, this explanation has no physiological basis. Al-
though some reports in the 1980s suggested that cocaine
base is more addictive than other forms of cocaine, these
claims have largely been shown to be false [41, 42]. In fact,
there is little scientific evidence suggesting that cocaine
base is substantially chemically different from other forms
of cocaine [10, 42, 43]. Physiologically, deterrence mecha-
nisms, such as sentencing policies, should have similar
effects on powder cocaine and cocaine base users. Further-
more, more recent research suggests that 85% of cocaine
users have not developed dependence after 10 years of use,
indicating that dependence is likely not a major factor in
trends in use [41]. To the extent that other behavioral char-
acteristics result in more inelastic demand among cocaine
base users compared to other drug users, of the establish-
ment of mandatory minimum sentences was insufficient to
change use at the population level – ultimately resulting in
the ineffectiveness of these policies.
Measurement error, whether due to social desirability
(resulting in underestimation of illicit activities), high
rates of incarceration of illicit drug users (who were thus
ineligible for the NSDUH), or our baseline definition of
cocaine base use, should have led to an exaggeration of
the decline in cocaine base use compared to our nega-
tive control of prescription drug misuse. As a result, our
null findings for the ADAA are undoubtedly conserva-
tive as this measurement error should have exaggerated
any effects of the law if they had been present. Findings
from the FSA cohort further suggest that mandatory
minimums did not impact cocaine use. If this law had
directly influenced cocaine use, the expected result
Fig. 2 Change in reported drug use after implementation of and relaxation of mandatory minimum sentencing policies
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would have been an increase use of in cocaine base with
the relaxation of sentencing penalties. In contrast, there
was again no change in use, with powder cocaine, a form
unaffected by the FSA declining in use.
There are several potential explanations for these find-
ings. Increasing awareness of the harms associated with
drug use – whether through formal awareness cam-
paigns, news reporting or local community efforts – oc-
curred alongside these criminal law changes. [44].
Relative cost or availability of other substances may have
led to substitution (i.e., use of marijuana or heroin in-
stead of cocaine) [45]. Availability and cost of cocaine it-
self may also be a contributing factor. In fact, other
studies exploring causes of the decreased cocaine con-
sumption in the 2000s have found that supply-side fac-
tors may have contributed to changing cocaine use
behavior in the United States [6, 45]. A variety of global
economic issues, increased seizures and reduced produc-
tion prevented easy importation while purity-adjusted
price increased by more than 40% [45–47]. Other
drug-specific trends may also contribute to our findings.
The popularity of different substances varies over time.
For instance, the rising prescription opioid epidemic that
began in the 2000s may have been a contributing factor
to lower cocaine use in the post-FSA period [48]. Future
research should assess opioid use (both prescription and
heroin) as a way of managing highs when other drugs
are not available or are less popular. This study should
be seen as aiming to rule out mandatory minimum sen-
tencing policies as the explanation for the decline in
cocaine base use, but not as providing an alternative ex-
planation. These findings need to be replicated in other
US data and in other countries that have reformed sen-
tencing guidelines for drug offenses.
Limitations
There are several limitations of the NSDUH survey data in
estimating changes in drug use behavior. First, while drug
use is self-reported, the reliability and validity of the
NSDUH measures have been demonstrated repeatedly
[34–36, 49]. However, to the extent that social desirability
is present, we would expect that after implementation of
more severe criminal penalties, cocaine use would be differ-
entially under-reported, contrary to these findings. Second,
only non-institutionalized civilians (e.g. non-incarcerated,
or not in a nursing facility or other institutionalized setting)
are eligible for the NSDUH. Therefore, if cocaine users
were incarcerated at higher rates after implementation of
the law, we would again expect to see larger decreases in
cocaine users. As we did not observe a significant decrease
in cocaine use post-ADAA, this suggests that these biases
did not substantially influence our results. It is possible that
the wide reach of the ADAA resulted in a spillover effect
into other substances, such as prescription drugs, that were
not addressed by the law. However, while a spillover effect
may contribute to the decline in prescription drug misuse
following the ADAA, it does not explain the continued de-
crease in prescription drug use following the FSA. Finally,
we were unable to account for state-level policies if enacted
during that time that may have modified the effect of fed-
eral policies in particular areas. However, a literature review
suggests that the ADAA held popular bipartisan appeal na-
tionwide at the time of enactment, as did the FSA, so that
states were not inclined to pass legislation that may coun-
teract the potency of either sentencing reform in the years
immediately before or after the federal reforms [16]. Add-
itionally, even if states chose to enact reforms, they would
have been required to be at least as restrictive or generally
similar to federal law [50]. Furthermore, recent evidence
has found that while states incarcerate for drug offenses at
varying rates, incarceration rates are not associated with re-
duced drug use [7].
Conclusions
NSDUH is the largest and most valid source of data on
drug use in the US population and uses standardized
methods for ensuring accuracy of assessment of illicit activ-
ities. Our quasi-experimental study design of examining the
imposition, then subsequent relaxation, of criminal senten-
cing penalties allowed for a rigorous assessment of the im-
pact of mandatory minimum sentencing laws on cocaine
use in the population. By including prescription tranquil-
izer/sedative misuse as a negative control, we added an
additional layer of control to more precisely identify
changes in drug use related to sentencing policies.
In sum, we found no direct correlation between mandatory
minimum sentencing laws on cocaine use. These findings
are consistent with the small body of extant literature on
mandatory minimum sentencing policies on narcotic use in
the mid-twentieth century. We do not, however, assume to
rule out other causes of the decline in cocaine use, but
merely state that findings do not support the claim that
mandatory minimum sentencing laws deter drug use. The
current opioid epidemic has somewhat different challenges
than the cocaine epidemic examined in this study (i.e., opioid
misuse and dependence often occurs subsequent to a legal
prescription to manage pain); therefore, we cannot directly
comment on the implications of our findings on opioid mis-
use. However, taken together with prior research, there is lit-
tle evidence that mandatory minimum sentencing laws deter
drug use behavior of cocaine or other illicit substances. Pol-
icymakers aiming to reduce substance misuse should instead
consider evidence-based program options for prevention or
treatment [51, 52].
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